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I. Introduction 
Whether, and to what extent, minimum wage legislation helps the poor is a 
crucial question for policymakers. Recent academic empirical work has 
sparked a heated debate with two clear sides: those who find evidence of 
adverse employment effects -- in line with the standard theoretical prediction -
- and those who fail to find such evidence (Freeman, 1996; Brown, 1999). If 
firms do not respond to minimum wage increases by reducing production and 
employment, they might respond by raising prices. Theory predicts that an 
industry wide cost shock, such as a minimum wage increase, is passed on to 
prices. A small, but growing, empirical literature has examined such price 
effects of minimum wages (Brown, 1999). However, this evidence is primarily 
focused on the relatively small US food sector, which employs a 
disproportionately large share of minimum wage workers. The main finding of 
small overall and sectoral price effects in the US (Card and Krueger, 1995) is 
thus perhaps not too surprising. It is far from clear whether such findings could 
be generalized to developing country contexts, where poverty is more 
extensive and minimum wages influence a larger proportion of the workforce.  
In this paper we estimate the minimum wage price effects in Brazil, using 
monthly household and firm data over nearly two decades. We thus provide, to 
the best of our knowledge, the first empirical evidence on the price effects of 
minimum wages in a key developing country. In Brazil, minimum wage 
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increases are large and frequent and the proportion of workers directly affected 
is large. In addition, minimum wage changes also indirectly influence a 
substantial number of workers, earning below and just above the minimum 
wage threshold. As a result, the effect of the minimum wage on wages is 
sizeable, although the effect on employment is small, as recent empirical 
evidence indicates (Neumark et al., 2003; Lemos, 2004). This suggests that 
Brazilian firms may pass on the rising labor costs, associated with minimum 
wage increases, mainly in the form of higher prices.  
Moreover, since our data contains information on the prices of goods 
consumed by the poor (and those consumed by the rich), we are able not only 
to estimate the price effect of a minimum wage in a poor country but also to 
examine its impact on the poor within the country. If the consumption bundle 
of the poor contains a large share of goods produced in low wage sectors then 
minimum wage increases may adversely affect the purchasing power of the 
poor. In addition, if such increases contribute substantially to overall price 
movements, the poor may again be adversely affected, as they suffer 
disproportionately from inflation. This is a particular concern in countries, like 
Brazil, where minimum wage changes have induced wage-price inflation 
spirals (Gramlinch, 1976; Freeman, 1996).  
The main finding of this paper is that poor consumers in Brazil are 
adversely affected by the price effect of minimum wage increases. They 
experience inflation rates three times higher than rich consumers in the month 
of the increase. The differential effects diminish over time with the poor 
experiencing twice the inflation rate of the rich after six months, but roughly 
the same rate after a year of adjustment. In conjunction with other evidence 
indicating that employment effects are clustered around zero (Brown, 1999; 
Freeman, 1996; Lemos, 2004), this suggests that minimum wage increases in 
Brazil are primarily passed on to consumers, with poor consumers bearing the 
brunt of the adverse inflationary effects.  
This paper is organized as follows. The data is introduced and described in 
Section 2. Our empirical approach is outlined in Section 3, which includes a 
discussion of the identification strategy. We present and discuss our results in 
Section 4, whilst Section 5 concludes. 
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II. Data 
II.1 Minimum Wage Data 
The minimum wage in Brazil is the same for all individuals. There are no 
differentiated minimum wage rates for different regions, specific demographic 
groups or labor market categories. Since the mid 1960s, the real minimum 
wage has been systematically under-indexed because nominal minimum wage 
increases are inflationary.  
Firstly, the nominal minimum wage has a strong effect on other wages in 
Brazil, as it was used as a coordinator of the wage policy (Carneiro and Faria, 
1998). In the presence of high inflation and distorted relative prices, rational 
agents took increases in the minimum wage as a signal for price and wage 
bargains - even after laws forbade its use as numeraire in 1987. The 
phenomena of minimum wage indexation and the reinforcement of inflationary 
expectations were first noticed by Gramlich (1976), and are more recently 
discussed by Card and Krueger (1995) and Freeman (1996). Maloney and 
Nunes (2004) show that the numeraire effect is a general phenomenon in Latin 
America.  
Secondly, the nominal minimum wage has a strong effect on the large and 
growing public deficit via benefits, pensions, and the Government wage bill. 
This impact was often a key criterion associated to the affordability of 
minimum wage increases.  
Figure 1 shows the erosion of the real minimum wage between January 
1982 and January 2000. The horizontal axis indicates the timing of the five 
stabilization plans over this period. The minimum wage increases during this 
period were subject to the rules of five different stabilization plans. These 
increases were large and frequent, but quickly eroded by the subsequent 
inflation. For example, in early 1986, the nominal minimum wage was 
increased by 15% and initially adjusted bi-annually. It was then adjusted 
whenever inflation was higher than 20%. Despite that, the real minimum wage 
was 25% lower in mid 1987 than it was in early 1986. The nominal minimum 
wage was then initially frozen for three months before it was indexed monthly 
by past inflation. In early 1989, it was again frozen, and in mid 1989 it was 
again indexed monthly. In early 1990, the real minimum wage was 45% lower 
than it was in early 1989. In late 1991, the nominal minimum wage was again 
indexed monthly. In 1993, adjustments were made bi-monthly and then 
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monthly. In early 1994, adjustments were made daily, but this did not prevent 
the real minimum wage from decreasing by 40% in the first half of 1994. In 
mid 1995 the nominal minimum wage was increased by 42%, and since then it 
has been adjusted annually.  
II.2 Price Data 
The choice of the price measure is very important in such a high 
inflationary environment. We use three different consumer indices to measure 
price increases across different income levels. The Wide Consumer Price 
Index (IPCA), the Consumer Price Index (IPC), and the Necessary Minimum 
Wage (SMN) measure inflation for consumption bundles of households 
earning, respectively, between 1 and 40, 1 and 8, and 1 times the minimum 
wage as defined in the 1988 Constitution. Even though such a bundle has been 
unaffordable at the prevalent minimum wage, SMN is the effective inflation 
experienced by poor consumers, while IPC and IPCA measure the inflation 
experienced by the middle-class and rich consumers. Although SMN is largest 
during the whole sample period, suggesting that inflation was highest for the 
poor, the pattern over time is similar for the three indices, suggesting that the 
poor and the rich were affected by similar inflation growth. The correlation 
between IPC and IPCA is 0.99 in differences, while the correlation between 
SMN and IPC or IPCA is 0.88 in differences. Figure 2 shows that the patterns 
of the log nominal minimum wage and log (national aggregate) IPC in 
differences are remarkably synchronized, with a correlation of 0.55.  
II.3 Other Data 
The remaining data we use is from PME (Household Monthly Employment 
Survey), PIM (Industrial Monthly Survey), ELETROBRAS (Brazilian 
Electricity Agency) and BACEN (Brazil Central Bank). PME is a household 
rotating panel survey, similar to the US CPS (Current Population Survey), 
available for the six main Brazilian metropolitan regions (Salvador, Recife, 
Belo Horizonte, Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo and Porto Alegre). PIM is a firm 
panel dataset available for most of the Brazilian metropolitan regions, 
including the six regions above. All data is monthly aggregated across these 
six regions between 1982 and 2000.  
The data show considerable regional variation, and it is this variation that 
we exploit to identify the minimum wage effect on prices in the models in 
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Section 3. Table 1 summarizes the main aspects of the data for a poor (Recife) 
and a rich region (Sao Paulo) over the sample period. All data is available 
from the IBGE (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica) and FGV 
(Fundacao Getulio Vargas).  
III. Empirical Approach 
III.1 Econometric Model 
Although the burden of minimum wage increases to consumers has not 
been of much interest in Labor Economics, the burden of taxation and 
exchange rate fluctuations is one of the most fundamental questions in Public 
Finance and International Economics (Poterba, 1996; Goldberg and Knetter, 
1997). A simple equation, commonly used in this so-called "pass-through" 
literature, is the inverse of the profit maximizing condition under imperfect 




For region i and time t,  is prices. We model costs by average wages itP , 
              
discussed in Section 4.  
minimum wage tMW , real interest rate itr , productivity itA , and industrial 
power consumpti it  (industrial power costs data was not available). We 
define the real interest rate as the national nominal interest rate minus regional 
inflation. And we define productivity as the total industrial production divided 
by total number of workers directly employed in production in the metallurgic 
industry. We use regional dummies to model region specific growth trends if , 
and month and year dummies to model time specific effects tf . The error te  
is itw . We use lagged rather than contemporaneous wages to circumvent 
endogeneity problems arising from the simultaneous determination of wages 
and prices at the macro level. We assume that the static specification is valid at 
each period and allow dynamics by adding lags and leads of the shock variable 
(indexed by l = -k,...,L) and lags of the dependent variable (indexed by  





As a robustness check, we estimate Equation (1) using two different 
production functions, Y=f (L) and Y=f (L,K) , where L is labor and K is 
cap
L LK
ital. If we assume that capital is fixed in the short run, we can constrain the 
coefficient of the real interest rate (δ ) to zero. The aim is to check whether the 
estimates are sensitive to controlling for the real interest rate, or put 
differently, to allowing the labor capital mix to be altered following a 
minimum wage increase.  
All models are sample size weighted to account for the relative importance 
of each region (and for heteroskedasticity arising from aggregation), as well as 
cor
nimum wage does not vary across regions in Brazil, 
rected for serial correlation across and within regions, assuming a region-
specific autoregressive process.  
III.2 Identification  
As the nominal mi  is 
uation (1). To circumvent this problem, the typical 
mi
defined as the proportion of workers earning one minimum 
wa
not fully identified in Eq
nimum wage variables used in the literature are the "Kaitz index", defined 
as the ratio of the minimum wage to average wage adjusted for coverage of the 
legislation (Kaitz, 1970), and "fraction affected", defined as the proportion of 
workers earning a wage between the old and the new minimum wage (Card, 
1992). The "Kaitz index" has been largely criticized in the literature because 
the variation in average wages is what drives the variation in the ratio in any 
given time period. As a result, the effect of the inverse of the average wages on 
prices is what would ultimately be estimated (Welch and Cunningham, 1978). 
"Fraction affected" has also been criticized in the literature because it is 
constant when the nominal minimum wage is constant, and thus does not 
capture the erosion of the minimum wage in relation to other wages and prices 
(Brown, 1999).  
A variable closely related to "fraction affected" is "fraction at" the 
minimum wage, 
ge (Dolado et al., 1996) (plus or minus 0.02%, to account for rounding 
approximations). Unlike "fraction affected", "fraction at" has variation across 
regions both when the nominal minimum wage is constant and when it is 
increased. Thus, in a similar fashion to Card and Krueger (1995), we use 
"fraction at" in place of log nominal minimum wage in Equation (1) to ensure 
identification of the effect of the minimum wage on prices. The new equation 
is: 
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Nonetheless, the interpretation of "fraction at" in Equation (2) is not 
straightforward. This is because the coefficient of interest β  is 
where  is the coefficient of interest. 
stim
ggested in the minimum wage literature that the poor are 
inimum wage labor intensive goods and that therefore they 
pay
informative of the change in prices given a change in the proportion of 
workers earning one minimum wage but not given a change in the 
minimum wage itself, which is the relevant policy variable. A more 
intuitive and policy relevant minimum wage variable is the interaction 
of the nominal minimum wage with "fraction at". This gives a weighted 
nominal minimum wage, where the impact of a national minimum wage 
increase in each region is being measured by the proportion of workers 
earning one minimum wage in that region. The correlation between log 
(national aggregate) IPC and log (national aggregate) weighted nominal 
minimum wage in differences is 0.45. Thus, we include the weighted 
nominal minimum wage in the model. The new equation is: 
 
Wβ
III.3 E ation 
It has been su
those consuming m
 proportionately more for the minimum wage increase (Freeman, 1996; 
MaCurdy and McIntyre, 2001). As discussed in Section 2.2, SMN, IPC and 
IPCA measure price increases experienced by consumers with different 
income levels. Thus, we use these indices to provide evidence on price 
increases paid by poor, middle-class and rich consumers, respectively, 
following minimum wage increases. The relevant question here is whether the 
inflation caused by minimum wage increases affects the poor more severely.  
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The preliminary evidence is that although SMN is largest during the whole 
sample period, indicating that inflation was highest for the poor, the pattern 
ov
creases for the Poor 
 estimates using SMN, the price index 
that measures the inflation experienced by poor consumers. The estimates of 
the ho
e effect of the minimum wage from the effect of the real interest 
rat
er time is similar for the three indices, suggesting that the poor and the rich 
were affected by similar inflation growth (see Section 2.2). To obtain further 
evidence, we use SMN, IPC and IPCA each in turn to estimate Equation (3). 
The respective Wβ  estimates measure the increase in prices paid by the poor, 
the middle-class and the rich following a minimum wage increase. If this 
estimate is larger in the SMN equation, then the poor are exposed to higher 
inflation following an increase.  
IV. Results 
IV.1 Price In
Panel A of Table 2 shows WLS Wβ
 static version of Equation (3), s wn in Panel A1, indicate that a 10% 
increase in the minimum wage raises prices by 0.09%, regardless of whether 
the real interest rate is controlled for or not. This effect is larger when allowing 
the effect of minimum wage increases on prices to take several months to be 
complete (adding lags of the shock variable) and when allowing several 
months for price adjustments in response to minimum wage increases (adding 
lags of the dependent variable). For example, the estimates allowing dynamics 
for six months, shown in Panel A2, indicate that a 10% increase in the 
minimum wage raises prices by 0.13% (0.12%) in the short run and by 0.27% 
(0.27%) in the long run before (after) controlling for the real interest rate. The 
slightly smaller estimate, when controlling for the real interest rate, suggests 
that the minimum wage is picking up some of the negative effect of the real 
interest rate on prices when Y=fL(L) is assumed. Furthermore, the short run 
estimates do not change when allowing dynamics for twelve months. 
Nonetheless, the long run estimates are smaller, as shown in Panel A3, 
suggesting that firms adjust on other margins (profits or employment) in the 
longer run.  
Our preferred specifications are those that control for the interest rate, thus 
separating th
e on prices. Using these specifications, a 10% increase in the minimum 
wage raises prices by 0.12% in the month of the increase and by 0.17% after 
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twelve months of adjustment. This suggests that the poor suffer from overall 
price increases triggered by raises in the minimum wage. This evidence is in 
line with theory and with previous overall price effects in the international 
literature ranging from 0.20% to 0.40% (Sellekaerts, 1981; MaCurdy and 
McIntyre, 2001; Aaronson, 2001).  
IV.2 Price Increases for the Rich 
Panels B and C of Table 2 show WLS  estimates using the price indices 
that measure the inflation experienced by middle-class (IPC) and rich (IPCA) 
con
similar picture to that for middle-class consumers. Using our preferred 
spe
above suggests that minimum wage increases significantly 
s in Brazil and that the poor are exposed to three times the 
inf
age increases are passed on to prices and are, 
the
 Wβ
sumers. The estimates of the static version of Equation (3), shown in Panel 
B1, indicate that a 10% increase in the minimum wage raises prices by 0.06% 
regardless of whether the real interest rate is controlled for or not. This effect 
is smaller when allowing for dynamics. For example, the estimates allowing 
dynamics for six months, shown in Panel B2, indicate that a 10% increase in 
the minimum wage raises prices by 0.05% (0.04%) in the short run and by 
0.17% (0.17%) in the long run before (after) controlling for the real interest 
rate. As before, this effect is slightly smaller in the short run after controlling 
for the real interest rate, but unchanged in the long run. The estimates are 
fairly robust when allowing dynamics for twelve months, as shown in Panel 
B3.  
The estimates for rich consumers, shown in Panels C1 to C3, demonstrate a 
very 
cifications, a 10% increase in the minimum wage raises prices by 0.05% 
(0.04%) for the middle-class (rich) in the month of the increase and by 0.15% 




lation rate that the rich are exposed to in the month of the increase, to twice 
that inflation after six months of adjustment, but to roughly the same inflation 
rate after twelve months.  
First, this evidence is supportive of the theoretical hypothesis, discussed in 
Section 1, which minimum w
refore, born by consumers. This is in line with employment effects 
clustered around zero, as reported in the empirical literature. Furthermore, the 
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evidence here suggests that minimum wage increases affect all consumers, 
through affecting overall prices.  
Second, although minimum wage increases affect all consumers, different 
consumers need not be affected in the same way. In the short run, the poor are 
exp
e poor suffer disproportionately more from any 
giv
 affect the poor. MaCurdy and 
Mc
osed to three times the inflation that the rich are exposed to. Either the poor 
spend a much larger share of their incomes on minimum wage labor intensive 
goods, or the prices of such goods go up by much more, or both. Thus, the 
poor bear more of the immediate burden of the increase. In the long run, 
however, the poor and the rich are exposed to roughly the same inflation rate. 
This suggests that the increase slowly propagates throughout the economy. 
This is because minimum wage workers are present in various sectors 
throughout the economy and thus the prices of a wide range of goods go up. 
Furthermore, the indexer and numeraire roles, together with wage spillover 
effects, propagate the increase (see Section 2.1). As a result, the rich (just like 
the poor) spend a substantial income share on goods whose prices went up 
(which are not only minimum wage labor intensive goods). Once the increase 
propagates throughout the economy, the burden is more evenly distributed 
across the poor and the rich.  
Third, the effect of the minimum wage on prices is clearly different for the 
poor compared to the rich. Th
en inflation rate -- this can be compared to a regressive sales tax. 
Furthermore, the poor suffer from higher inflation for the first six months after 
the increase, when they are exposed to almost twice the inflation the rich are 
exposed to. Only after twelve months does the inflation rate for the poor fall to 
similar, but still slightly higher levels than that of the rich -- which is roughly 
the same after six or after twelve months of adjustments. Thus, the poor carry 
a substantially heavier share of the burden.  
These results suggest that, even if detrimental employment effects are 
small, the minimum wage may adversely
Intyre (2001) provide evidence for the US that supports this view. This is 
particularly the case if minimum wage increases induce wage-price inflation 
spirals (Gramlich, 1976; Freeman, 1996) that quickly erode the benefits of the 
increase and leave more permanent inflation side effects, like in Brazil.  
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V. Conclusion 
In this paper we estimated the effect of the minimum wage on prices paid 
by poor and rich consumers using monthly Brazilian household and firm data 
over nearly two decades. The results indicate that the minimum wage raises 
overall prices in Brazil. This is in line with evidence in the literature that 
suggests that employment effects are clustered around zero.  
Nonetheless, although minimum wage increases affect all consumers, 
different consumers need not be affected in the same way. We show that the 
poor are exposed to three times the inflation rate that the rich are exposed to in 
the month of the increase, to twice that inflation after six months, but to 
roughly the same inflation after twelve months. A 10% increase in the 
minimum wage raises prices paid by the poor (rich) by 0.12% (0.04%) in the 
month of the increase, by 0.27% (0.16%) after six months, and by 0.17% 
(0.15%) after twelve months. This is in line with theory and with previous 
empirical results in the international literature, which reports overall price 
effects ranging from 0.20% to 0.40%.  
Thus, the poor bear more of the brunt of the inflationary effects of the 
increase and that continues to be the case for the following six months. After 
twelve months, however, the burden is more evenly distributed between the 
poor and the rich. This occurs because minimum wage workers are present in 
various sectors throughout the economy, because of the indexer and numeraire 
roles played by the minimum wage and because of wage spillover effects.  
The main policy implication following from these results is that minimum 
wage increases might adversely affect the poor in Brazil. Even if detrimental 
employment affects are small, raising the nominal incomes of poor working 
households, we have shown that the cost of poor households consumption 
bundles will rise. Furthermore, the impact of minimum wage increases on 
overall prices has a lasting adverse effect on the poor, who disproportionately 
suffer from inflation. More research is needed to explore what the overall 
effect of minimum wage increases on the poor is, before the minimum wage 
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JEL Classification: J32. 
Minimum wage legislation is potentially a powerful policy tool to help 
alleviate poverty in developing countries. This is especially the case when the 
detrimental employment effects are small. However, of critical importance is 
whether, and to what extent, minimum wage increases will generate price 
effects that might adversely affect the poor. This might occur, firstly, if the 
poor consume a lot of goods produced in sectors dominated by minimum wage 
workforces. Secondly, this may occur if minimum wage increases raise overall 
prices, as the poor disproportionately suffer from inflationary costs. In this 
paper we estimate minimum wage price effects for Brazil, using monthly 
household and firm data over nearly two decades. We find that minimum wage 
increases significantly raise overall prices in Brazil. Furthermore, we examine 
the price effect of the minimum wage separately on poor and rich consumers. 
The poor experience inflation rates three times higher that the latter, in the 
immediate aftermath of a minimum wage increase, with the differential effect 
diminishing over time. 
Keywords: minimum wages, labor costs, price effects, cost shocks, Brazil. 
 
